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Abstract. Physicalism is an ontological doctrine according to which everything in the 
world is physical in the last instance. This is usually interpreted as a claim that every 
non-physical, most notably every mental property can either be reduced to some 
physical property or shown to supervene on it. The main obstacle in an attempt to 
formulate physicalism properly is Hempel’s dilemma, and the most promising strategy 
of taking this dilemma is based on the argument from causal closure of physics. After 
analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of this approach, I argue that it is highly 
controversial and thus unable to support a strong ontological commitment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The level of confidence of both general public and the scientific community in the ability 
of physical science to adequately explain and even predict the future course of various 
phenomena in its domain has been exceptionally high in the past couple of centuries. That 
confidence stems from incontrovertible successes of theoretical physics, but it is mainly 
boosted by the unprecedented rise of the ensuing technologies. There was little doubt in the 
minds of the majority of scientists in the best part of the twentieth century that 
methodological naturalism, as the core method of physical sciences, according to which all 
scientific hypotheses and results should be interpreted and explained by referring to natural 
causes and events, will eventually lead to the complete theoretical description of the world.  
At the same time, rising evidence in the realms of natural, as well as cognitive sciences, 
apparently indicates that there are no irreducible mental (psychological), biological, social or 
other entities (Papineau, 2001). In other words, they can seemingly all be ultimately reduced 
to some physical entities and processes. As a consequence, a radical form of ontological 
monism, which became known as physicalism, has gained strength. It basically claims that 
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2 D. R. DIMITRIJEVIĆ 
there is nothing over and above physical in the world (Dowel, 2006), meaning that 
everything is physical in the last instance. This claim relies on the view that all natural causes 
can in principle be brought down to some underlying physical causes. The proposition that if 
a physical event has a cause, that cause must be physical, became known as the causal 
closure principle.  It is hard to imagine how the thesis of physicalism can be defended 
without invoking this principle, despite the fact that there are some isolated claims to the 
contrary (Stoljar, 2014). The inherent ambiguity of the phrase “over and above” in the 
formulation of physicalism, however, clearly calls for some further explication, which 
confronts the proponents of physicalism with serious difficulties. The discussion of these 
difficulties and of various attempts to overcome them by relying on causal closure principle 
constitutes the main aim of this paper. I will try to show that these attempts fell short of the 
mark and that the argument from causal closure of physics in itself is not capable of 
supporting a radical metaphysical claim like physicalism. 
It should be noted that some authors identify physicalism with materialism, which 
cannot be considered wrong, but is not common in recent times, since the classical 
materialist picture of the world involves ideas such as impenetrability of matter, or 
interaction between bodies only upon contact. The term “physicalism” thus highlights the 
fact that contemporary notion of matter incorporates properties unknown to traditional 
materialism, such as physical fields, forces acting at a distance, quantum-mechanical 
objects which exhibit the properties of both particles and waves etc. 
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of some of the most important 
attempts to formulate physicalism and the difficulties which they come upon, the 
argument for physicalism from causal closure of physics will be presented in the third 
section. This argument, based on the causal closure principle, is widely considered the 
strongest support to physicalist thesis and the main reason for believing in it. In the fourth 
section some objections to this argument are given and shown to support the view that 
current attempts to formulate physicalism by inferring to causal closure principle are 
unfounded. The conclusion is presented in the final section. 
2. THE FORMULATION OF PHYSICALISM 
In contemporary philosophy physicalism is closely connected with the problem of 
understanding the nature of the relationship between mind and matter, or the mind-body 
problem. An attempt to solve this problem by reducing all instantiations of mental 
properties to some physical properties (Feigl, 1958; Smart, 1959) led to the formulation 
of the type physicalism. It is the generalization of the identity theory, whose essence is 
captured by the famous remark of J. J. C. Smart that sensations are nothing “over and 
above” the brain processes (Smart, 1959), which means that mental processes should be 
identified with the neurological processes in the brain. More strictly, type physicalism 
claims that for every instantiation of mental property M at time t there is some physical 
property P such that M is identical to P at t. The main difficulty of this approach is its 
inability to solve the problem of multiple realizability – namely, it implies that the same 
mental phenomenon can be realized by many different neurological processes. 
Another statement of physicalism that is often found in the literature is token 
physicalism. It claims that for every object, event or process x there is some physical object, 
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event or process y such that x = y. Here the notion “event” designates an instantiation of a 
property at a time. This is obviously a form of nonreductive physicalism, since its 
formulation doesn‟t eliminate the possibility that some physical entities possess irreducible 
mental, biological, social or other non-physical properties. Thus, it doesn‟t capture the 
requirement of minimal physicalism – the minimum commitment of all physicalist positions. 
Moreover, token physicalism insists that every mental, biological, moral or social particular 
must have a physical equivalent, which is clearly an unsustainable requirement. For example, 
it is hard to find physical entities identical to notions such as “goodness” or “concept”. 
Since type and token physicalism were unable to cope with important objections, most of 
the advocators of physicalism nowadays uphold some form of supervenient physicalism. It is 
a form of nonreductive physicalism according to which all psychological, moral, social and 
other properties supervene on physical properties without identifying with them, somewhat 
similar to the way the picture on the TV screen emerges from, or supervenes on the pattern 
of dots without reducing to them. Since the main goal of any physicalism is to prevent the 
possibility of mind-body dualism, supervenience thesis primarily points out that every 
mental property M has a physical supervenience base – a physical property P. More strictly, 
supervenience thesis claims that physicalism is true at our world if and only if any world 
which is physically identical to it must be identical to it in all respects. It is a contingent 
thesis which clearly captures the requirement of minimal physicalism, avoiding at the same 
time the pitfalls which have already proven fatal for type and token physicalism (Stoljar, 
2014; Smart, 1959; Kim, 1993; Kim, 2005).  
All is not well, however, for the proponents of physicalism, because some pretty 
strong arguments have been presented in the philosophy of mind against any form of 
physicalism, including the supervenient one. There is yet to be proposed a strong enough 
response to the argument from knowledge, also known as the argument of Mary‟s room, 
or the whole family of conceivability arguments (Jackson, 1993; Chalmers, 1996). 
From the point of view of the philosophy of science, an extremely difficult problem 
arose quite unexpectedly, concerning the indeterminacy of the notion of “physical” in the 
definition of physicalism. Any formulation of physicalism is useless unless we define 
precisely what we mean by physical property. We can do it by tying the notion of a 
physical property to the notion of either a physical object or a physical theory. 
The object conception assumes that it is possible to make a list of paradigmatic 
physical objects, such as rocks, planets or electrons, and then define physical property as 
the property which characterizes the intrinsic nature of such objects. This conception is 
unsatisfactory, primarily because it a priori dismisses the possibility that future science 
may uncover some novel, say biological or psychological properties of paradigmatic 
objects in question. There is no reason to believe that some of those discoveries won‟t be 
able to radically change our understanding of the “physical”. 
The theory-based conception is seemingly better founded. It tells us that the property is 
physical if it is a part of the vocabulary of a physical theory, or else it logically supervenes 
on such a property. This way, we can categorize as physical not only the obvious properties 
of objects around us, like mass or thermal conductivity of a stone or a metal rod, but also 
more exotic properties of objects which exist far from our experiential realm – like spin of 
elementary particles, or flavour of quarks. The main objection against this conception is 
known as Hempel‟s dilemma (Hempel, 1969, 1980) and can be formulated in the following 
way: 
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1. If we interpret the notion “physical” as something that contemporary physics 
claims exists, than physicalism is false because contemporary physics most 
certainly isn‟t complete, therefore it must be false. 
2. If the notion “physical” is interpreted as something that a future, ideal and 
complete physics contains, than physicalism is an empty, or even a trivial thesis, 
because we don‟t know what kind of entities some future physics will postulate. 
Its content may include some biological or psychological items, in a way we can‟t 
even try to imagine at present. 
Chomsky, for example, came to the conclusion that it is quite possible that the future 
physics will have to include some irreducible mental properties in its basic repertoire 
[Chomsky, 1995]. Although it would certainly render physicalism trivial, Chomsky 
regarded the investigation of the physical basis of mental states necessary. His suggestion 
is in line with famous pessimistic metainduction argument (Laudan, 1981), which 
undermines the epistemic optimism by assuming that our current theories are by no means 
true, since the history of science teaches us that every scientific theory is sooner or later 
proven false and therefore abandoned. Melnyk (Melnyk, 2003) was one of the authors 
who attempted to counter this argument, and at the same time take the first horn of 
Hempel‟s dilemma, by asserting that we have a good enough reason to believe in the 
actual physical theories: namely, they are more successful than their rivals. He then goes 
on to conclude that contemporary science offers rich empirical support to the monistic 
claims of physicalism, and none whatsoever to dualism as its most important rival. 
Although this approach seems to be convincing to some extent, it does not quite succeed 
in refuting the challenge posed by the pessimistic meta-induction argument and thus 
supporting the theory-based conception of the physical property. 
Following a different line of thought, Galen Strawson advocates the idea of panpsychism, 
according to which at least some of the fundamental constituents of reality must be 
intrinsically empirical (Strawson, 2006), because empirical phenomena cannot arise from 
entirely non-empirical ones. This obviously implies that everything is at least partially 
conscious. Although this idea – a bit surprisingly – appears to be consistent with most of the 
formulations of physicalism, it remains untenable for the vast majority of physicalists, the 
way it was untenable for the proponents of the old materialism. This is understandable, 
because exclusion of mental properties from basic vocabulary of physics is the primary 
intuition behind any formulation of physicalism. Dowell names this intuition the 
conceptual continuity constraint and considers it among the most important criteria for a 
successful minimal definition of physicalism. In his words, “the content of the notion of 
the physical must retain sufficient overlap with our pre-theoretical notion as it figures in 
our intuitive formulation of physicalism” (Dowel, 2006). 
In recent years, significant number of philosophers made an attempt to bypass the 
conundrum of Hempel‟s dilemma by defining the notion of a physical property without 
tying it to any particular physical theory (Crook and Gillett, 2001; Montero and Papineau, 
2005; Wilson, 2006; Worley, 2006). According to their via negativa argument, a property 
P is physical if and only if P is non-mental. Consequently, physicalism can easily be 
formulated as the reductivist claim that all the entities in the world are fundamentally 
physical, which by definition means that they are non-mental. At first, this approach 
seems promising because it avoids not only Hempel‟s dilemma, but also the unpleasant 
possibility that some form of panpsychism satisfies the definition of physicalism.  At 
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closer inspection, however, some serious flaws of via negativa become transparent. First 
of all, this approach a priori prevents the existence of properties which are neither physical 
nor mental. But one cannot a priori dismiss the possibility that future science will include, 
for example, properties compatible with biological emergentism or vitalism. Secondly, via 
negativa eliminates the possibility that some properties are both physical and mental. Many 
reductive physicalists are not ready to accept such a constraint, because it would eliminate 
the theory of identity. To use just one famous example, it would become impossible to 
identify the feeling of pain with c-fibers firing. Finally, it is not certain that we are able to 
define mental properties more successfully than physical properties. Therefore, in order to 
formulate physicalism as an ontological doctrine one should be able to say something 
positive about what it means for a property or an event to be physical. 
3. THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSAL CLOSURE OF PHYSICS 
Arguably the most convincing argument for physicalism at the moment is the 
argument from causal closure, or the argument from completeness of physics, recently 
advanced by Papineau (Papineau, 2001) and Kim (Kim, 2005), among others. It consists 
of three premises: 
1. The causal closure principle: 
If a physical effect has a cause, then it has a sufficient physical cause. 
2. Mental causation: 
Every mental event has a physical effect. 
3. The causal exclusion principle: 
If a physical event x has a sufficient cause y, than no other event can be the cause 
of y at the same time, unless it is supervenient on x. 
The conclusion of the argument is that all mental occurrences must be either identical 
to physical occurrences, or supervene on them. 
Let us examine the argument in more detail. The first premise – the causal closure 
principle – effectively claims that while construing a causal chain in order to explain a 
physical event we never need to leave the domain of the physical. In other words, every 
event in a causal chain leading to a physical effect must also be physical. Note that the 
proposed formulation of the causal closure principle allows the possibility that some 
physical effects do not have causes and in that respect it is different to the deterministic 
claim that every physical effect has a physical cause. The second premise, mental 
causation, acknowledges the fact that mental occurrences, such as our decisions, lead to 
physical consequences – thus explaining, for example, the chain of events starting with 
my feeling of headache and finishing with me taking a pill. This premise is necessary for 
the formulation of the argument because the causal closure in itself doesn‟t exclude mind-
body dualism – the view that our world consists of two entirely and irreducibly distinct 
kinds of entities, mental and physical. The causal exclusion principle, finally, accounts for 
the fact that physical effects of mental causes are not all overdetermined. This means that 
while particular instances of physical properties may be caused by multiple mental 
occurrences acting simultaneously, the possibility that every instance of that physical 
property is in the same way overdetermined can be rejected. Accepting these premises 
entails accepting the conclusion that the physicalist thesis is true. 
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A variety of anti-physicalist responses to all three premises of the argument can be 
found in the literature. Particularly powerful are the epiphenomenalist attacks on mental 
causation, based on the claim that mental properties can be viewed as mere “nomological 
danglers” with respect to causal behavior: they can be caused by physical events, yet they 
are causally idle. The discussion is also in order concerning the causal closure principle – 
the central claim of the argument and consequently the main pillar of both reductive and 
supervenient physicalist positions. 
The argument from causal closure of physics is extremely sensitive to the way in 
which the notion of causality is understood. A number of prominent authors, like Russell 
(Russell, 1917) and Heisenberg (Heisenberg, 1961), even maintained that there is no 
place for causation in the contemporary science. A similar position has recently been 
defended by Norton (Norton, 2007), who has argued that there is no causality in science 
at a fundamental level, but that it can be retained in the scientific vocabulary as an 
auxiliary notion, in the same way as we can retain the notion of caloric while explaining 
thermal conductivity. Other authors, on the other hand, while accepting causality, argued 
that the causal closure principle cannot be used in defense of physicalism (Bishop, 2006; 
Dupre, 2001; Dimitrijević, 2014). 
This much is certain, however: in an attempt to use the argument from causal closure 
of physics to support physicalism one must not take causal dependency of one event upon 
another merely as a counterfactual dependency. As is always the case in physics, the 
complete mechanism of interaction between the two events must be described, including 
the flow of energy or the electric charge, the action of forces, the transfer of momentum 
and so forth. This important requirement has been met by different authors with varying 
success.  Probably the most explicit strategy in that sense is the one formulated by 
Vincente (Vincente, 2011). His approach is worth considering in detail if for no other 
reason than because it is arguably the most explicit account of the causal closure principle 
applied to the formulation of physicalism. It contains virtually all the elements that can 
generally be found in various related arguments, which will provide us with the 
opportunity to analyze them severally. This in turn will give us a clearer picture of severe 
limitations that the attempts of formulating physicalist thesis are confronted with. 
Vincente assumes the current approach: he takes the first horn of Hempel‟s dilemma 
by postulating that some crucial features of current physics will not be overcome by some 
future, ideal and complete physics. He identifies the main conservation laws as such 
features. No future physics, according to Vincente, is possible without the laws of 
conservation of energy, charge, momentum, and probably a limited number of other 
fundamental quantities possessed by bodies. Moreover, he defines bodies – or, more general, 
the entities – as bearers, or aggregates of conserved quantities, and caused physical changes 
as variations in some conserved quantity. On this account all the events or effects the causal 
closure principle refers to come down to changes of conserved quantities possessed by 
bodies. Vincente goes on to explain causes of physical changes in terms of forces acting on 
bodies. The list of forces which bring about variations of conserved quantities includes 
various manifestations of four fundamental physical interactions: strong, electromagnetic, 
weak and gravitational; however, Vincente perceives the danger of falling victim to the 
second horn of Hempel‟s dilemma by closing the list of forces at any particular time, since 
the future physics may easily include some newly discovered forces in that list. He tries to 
evade this danger by only requiring that physical quantities are conserved “in a relevant 
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class of local interactions when the system considered is the whole universe”, where this 
relevant class includes “all the local interactions in which space-time is not involved as a 
putative bearer of energy”. He believes that this maneuver abolishes the need to specify 
the list of forces responsible for distribution and exchange of physical quantities, because 
any kind of non-physical force typically postulated by mind-body dualists fails to satisfy 
these requirements. The conclusion of Vincente‟s argument is that all physical changes have 
sufficient physical causes, which confirms the causal closure principle and, via the argument 
of causal closure of physics, verifies physicalism. 
Vincente‟s construal highlights an intention which is common to the majority of 
contemporary physicalists: to define current physics minimally. A successful completion of 
this programme would not only make the formulation of physicalism possible; it would 
achieve an equally significant epistemic breakthrough by seriously weakening the 
pessimistic meta-induction argument. It would do so simply by proving that today‟s physics 
rests on the firm ground and that at least its fundamental assertions will remain intact over 
time. I believe that the following discussion will show that these ambitious aspirations are 
unfounded. 
4. OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSAL CLOSURE OF PHYSICS 
The most obvious objection to the argument from causal closure of physics is that it 
can only be applied to non-physical events – particularly mental occurrences – which do 
have physical effects. This is directly implied by the premise of mental causation. Even 
the most fervent proponents of physicalism, such as Papineau and Kim, admit that this 
imposes a serious limitation to the generality of the argument, because there are important 
realms of reality which don‟t have physical effects. For example, there is no physical 
object or event that can be identified with mathematical or moral facts. Papineau 
(Papineau, 2001) considered this to be “a genuine boundary to the proper ambitions of 
physicalism”, which made him adopt considerably weaker understanding of physicalism, 
according to which only that is physical which interacts causally with the physical world. 
Kim (Kim, 2005) has reached similar conclusion while trying to carry his programme of 
formulating a version of reductionist physicalism through. He was eventually forced to admit 
that only intentional properties are reducible, while qualitative properties of consciousness, 
or “qualia”, are not. One cannot reduce to physical basis the experience of red colour, for 
example, or the taste of an apple, or the feeling of pain. Kim concluded that global 
physicalism was untenable, which means that “there is a possible world identical to ours in 
all respects except for the fact that in that world qualia are distributed differently”.  
This is an important conclusion. Although Kim is convinced, much like Papineau, that 
a weakened physicalism can still be defended, the fact remains that it is incapable of 
addressing one of the main questions of philosophy, known as “the hard problem of 
consciousness” – the problem of giving an account of the phenomenal consciousness. 
Now, Kim went to great lengths to eliminate mental-to-mental causation, because he could 
find no mechanism which could explain how one mental occurrence can directly cause 
another. Moreover, he also excluded the possibility of “downward” mental-to-physical 
causation for the same reason. Effectively, he denied that mental properties have any kind of 
causal power. One way they can influence physical world is by assuming that they are non-
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causally connected with physical properties they supervene on; they in turn cause other 
physical properties, which are the bases of other mental properties. This is the position of 
supervenient physicalism. The other way is to postulate that mental properties are 
identical to their base physical properties and accordingly reduce mental-to-mental causation 
to ordinary physical causation, which is the position of Kim‟s reductive physicalism. Both 
positions are weakened, however, by the conclusion that qualia are casually impotent, 
because it renders the physicalist worldview incoherent and opens the space for various 
epiphenomenalist interpretations, such as the one proposed by Chalmers (Chalmers, 1996). 
Moreover, I believe that the physicalist position is even weaker than writers like Papineau 
and Kim make it look. For as long as the hard problem of consciousness remains unresolved, 
the possibility that at least some phenomenal properties make an integral part of causal 
chains leading to physical effects cannot be ruled out. There is a possibility, for example, 
that phenomenal properties create a mental disposition which enhances the probability of the 
occurrence of one or the other intentional property. However unlikely, this cannot be 
excluded in principle. Therefore, by following backwards a causal chain leading to a 
physical effect, we might end up with a mental, phenomenal property which ultimately set 
the chain of events in motion. As the consequence, the first premise of the argument from 
causal closure of physics, the causal closure principle, would be false. Thus, the conclusion 
of the argument would also be false, as would be the physicalist claim. 
In order to bring the conundrum into sharper focus, let us turn our discussion to 
Vincente‟s strategy, which was expounded in the previous section. A host of questions 
can be asked about the possibility of singularly identifying a physical body, as the bearer 
of a set of conserved quantities, in the light of Heisenberg‟s uncertainty relations. A lot can 
also be said about the generality and long-term tenability of some of the conservation laws, 
bearing in mind that the majority of them have been discovered relatively recently. Space-
time substantivists even question the validity of the assumption that space-time itself cannot 
be a bearer of energy; they argue that it can even capture energy and give it back. These are 
the topics of continuing discussion in literature, but I cannot get involved in them here. I will 
assume instead that the first part of Vincente‟s construal is uncontroversial – that we can 
unequivocally identify a physical body as an aggregate of certain conserved properties, such 
as energy, momentum and charge, and caused physical changes as variations in some of 
those conserved quantities. Every physicist will also agree that these changes are brought 
about by some external forces. Herein lies the major difficulty, though, because the very 
notion of force, as well as its utilization in physics and philosophy, has always been the 
subject of some controversy. The main source of this controversy is the gap that lies 
between nomological and metaphysical explanations of forces. Namely, it is one thing to 
find a law which describes the relevant features of a force, and a completely different 
proposition to understand its innermost nature. For example, our nomological description 
of gravitational interaction is rather thorough, but our understanding of its metaphysical 
essence is highly unsatisfying.  
The force can be understood as the push or the pull on a body which tends to change the 
state of its motion, in accordance with the basic laws of dynamics formulated by Newton and 
their subsequent generalizations. To say that we know what caused a physical effect usually 
means that we understand the nature and the law of the force acting on a body or a physical 
system and changing the velocity of the body or some parts of the system. Interestingly 
enough, neither Newtonian classical dynamics nor current physics specify the nature of the 
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causes of forces, nor do they impose any constraint on fundamental forces other than the 
requirement of them being conservative. On that basis alone the possibility arises that some 
physical effects can be caused by non-physical, mental forces. The eventuality of a non-
physical force being added to the list of fundamental forces of future physics is consistent 
not only with the second horn of Hempel‟s dilemma, but more importantly with everything 
that the history of science teaches us. In fact, there is no reason why this non-physical force 
wouldn‟t even be conservative. The idea is far from novel; its origin can be traced back to 
the works of a number of eighteenth century scientists who postulated the existence of vital 
and mental forces, such as sensibility and irritability, and debated at length about the relation 
between them.  
Now, the way Vincente deals with this eventuality is highly unsatisfactory. He simply 
a priory overrules mental causation and states that the inclusion of mental forces is 
improbable because “it is extremely hard to imagine that physics will develop in such a 
way”, and further still, “whatever such a mental force might explain is already explained 
by the action of the forces already posited”. His conviction clearly leans on the recent 
development of natural sciences. Like most arguments based on inductive reasoning, 
however, it lacks generality and stringency.  
Papineau, on the other hand, approaches this potential problem in a much more elaborate 
way. He recognizes two possible types of mental forces, both capable of violating the 
completeness of physics: non-deterministic and deterministic Newtonian mental forces. The 
former would manifest themselves by causing spontaneous changes of movement of certain 
particles of matter, thereby influencing the course of some physical processes. Such forces 
would cause erratic behavior of systems they act upon, which would have made them easily 
observed and accounted for. Since this is not the case, we will not engage in the discussion 
about them in this paper. Deterministic mental forces, on the other hand, would be 
governed by force laws of strictly deterministic character. We could easily imagine physical 
systems whose constituents time evolutions would be governed by superposition of all the 
forces, physical and non-physical, operating within the system. The behavior of such systems 
would be deterministic and predictable, so it is hard to believe that most physicists would lose 
sleep over the fact the causal closure of physics would be refuted. In fact, the most probable 
development would involve gradual inclusion of deterministic mental forces in the list of 
physical forces, which would lead to certain widening of the domain of physics. After all, one 
of the main goals of any physical research is to predict the future behavior of the system 
investigated. If the results obtained in relevant measurements are consistent with the 
predictions of a model which involves deterministic mental forces, even the most fervent 
physicalist would gladly change perspective. The concession she would have to make 
consists mainly in accepting the conclusion that the mind cannot be identified with the brain. 
The main argument against the possibility of mental forces, frequently used in various 
forms by those who subscribe to the physicalist views, is the stubborn fact that there is 
still no evidence of their existence. Papineau, for example, ascribes special significance to 
the fact that despite huge advances made by physiology, neurophysiology and other 
related sciences in the bygone century, no manifestation of any special non-physical, 
particularly mental force causing anomalous accelerations inside living bodies has been 
observed. The conventional non-physicalist response to this argument is that it may only 
be a matter of time before we discover the way to detect mental forces which, supposedly, 
operate inside our brains. The fact that the argument against non-physical forces is 
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inductively based leaves plenty of space for both sides in the debate to dig their hills in. 
There is nothing wrong with inductive arguments, of course, as long as we don‟t lose sight 
of the fact that they can‟t be purely logically refuted; that would be possible only if they 
were analytically performed. For that reason, non-physicalists are often forced to found 
their argumentation on construing conceivable alternatives to physicalist assertions. My 
forthcoming suggestion will be along these lines. 
Let us ask ourselves: if there were Newtonian deterministic mental forces, what would 
they act upon? How would we measure them? The only conceivable answer to the former 
question is that they operate by accelerating some particles in brains in a way which 
cannot be explained by taking known physical forces into account. Their measurement 
would be difficult since there is no way to measure the force directly. All we can really 
measure are space and time intervals; even the displacement of a pointer on a most 
sophisticated laboratory instrument is nothing more than a simple kinematic observable. 
Our conclusions concerning derived, more complex quantities, as well as the way we 
calibrate our measuring instruments are highly dependent on relevant physical theories. 
All our techniques of measuring Newtonian forces are thus based on their general 
definition: we are measuring relevant spatial displacements in corresponding intervals of 
time, after which we conclude that there is a force F=ma at work. This logic is 
incontrovertible in all the conventional physical systems, but it is far from certain that it 
should remain unaltered when mental occurrences are taken into account. In other words, 
one cannot a priori deny the possibility that there are deterministic non-Newtonian mental 
forces. By definition, the governing law of these hypothetical forces would be different to 
the one postulated by Newton. 
Now, why would anyone want to suggest such an unusual idea? After all, Newton‟s 
conception of the force has endured centuries of rapid development of physics and are 
usually counted as one of its firmest cornerstones. However, it is hard to ignore the fact that 
the explanation of phenomenal consciousness along the lines of physics cannot be counted 
among the successes of our science. That‟s exactly why it is often called “hard problem of 
consciousness”. Let‟s assume for a moment that mind-body dualists are right in that mental 
occurrences can neither be reduced to physical effects, nor supervene on them. As far as I 
can see, there are only two possible explanations of our inability to find any sign of mental 
forces. It might be that the changes caused by the Newtonian mental forces in the brain are 
extremely delicate and that perhaps only in the distant future our measuring techniques may 
become sophisticated enough to detect them. If one is not ready to accept this, the only 
remaining dualist option would be to suppose that mental forces do not operate in a usual 
way, by causing mechanical changes and accelerations, but by causing some other changes 
in the brain. Those changes may not be detectable by our measuring techniques, which are 
conceived in a way that makes them applicable for measuring only effects caused by 
Newtonian forces. We may only speculate that mental forces might cause changes of some 
mental properties, instead of causing changes in velocity, but that is as far as we can go here. 
I believe that I have done enough to illustrate some of the controversies surrounding any 
attempt to use the argument from causal closure of physics in order to overcome Hempel‟s 
dilemma and thus support physicalist claim. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Physicalism is a highly influential ontological thesis. Its proponents often point out 
that in the last fifty or sixty years the majority of physicists have gradually accepted one 
or the other version of the claim that there is nothing over and above physical. This 
tendency is understandable given that physics is as successful as one could hope and also 
that the existence of irreducible mental properties and occurrences is extremely hard to 
prove. 
On the other hand, there are plenty of reasons to resist this doctrine. Some people feel 
that it would deprive us of our agency and free will, while some maintain that it is 
unsustainable for purely philosophical reasons – citing, for instance, its inability to give 
an account of the phenomenal consciousness, or of the realms of mathematics, ethics and 
values in general. 
I believe that physicalist thesis is probably too ambitious because, as our discussion 
has shown, it is a difficult task to even formulate it properly. The gravest challenge in that 
respect is known as Hempel‟s dilemma, and the most promising attempt to resolve this 
conundrum is the argument from causal closure of physics. In this paper I undertook the 
task of analyzing this approach and showing that it was ultimately controversial and thus 
unable to support a strong metaphysical commitment. That means that it is even 
impossible to judge this ontological thesis as true or false. It turns out that D. H. Mellor 
was probably right when he characterized physicalism as “the wrong answer to an 
essentially trivial question” (Mellor, 1995). 
Where does it leave the upholders of physicalism? Since it is hardly satisfying as a 
doctrine after all, they may find it helpful to adopt it as an attitude, as Alyssa Nay has 
recently proposed (Nay, 2008). If taking an attitude to formulate one‟s ontology 
according to the posits of physics can help a researcher or a philosopher in her work, than 
it could be a useful stance. Whether a convinced physicalist would find this suggestion 
satisfying or not is, of course, an entirely different matter. 
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UZROČNA ZATVORENOST FIZIKE I FORMULISANJE 
FIZIKALIZMA 
Fizikalizam je ontološka doktrina prema kojoj je sve na svetu u poslednjoj instanci fizičko. Ovo 
se obično interpretira kao tvrdnja da se svako nefizičko, a posebno mentalno svojstvo može 
redukovati na neko fizičko svojstvo, ili se može pokazati da na njemu supervenira. Glavna 
prepreka pokušajima da se fizikalizam adekvatno formuliše je Hempelova dilema, a strategija 
suočavanja sa ovom dilemom, koja najviše obećava, bazirana je na argumentu uzročne 
zatvorenosti fizike. Nakon analize dobrih i loših strana ovog pristupa, zaključujem da je on jako 
kontroverzan i da samim tim nije u stanju da podrži snažnu ontološku tezu. 
Ključne reči: uzročna zatvorenost, fizikalizam, supervenijentnost, zakoni održanja 
